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Abstract: The main thesis of this paper is that Pap’s The Functional A Priori in
Physical Theory and Cassirer’s Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics
may be conceived as two kindred accounts of a late Neo-Kantian philosophy of
science. They elucidate and clarify each other mutually by elaborating conceptual
possibilities and pointing out affinities of neo-Kantian ideas with other currents of
20th century’s philosophy of science, namely, pragmatism, conventionalism, and
logical empiricism. Taking into account these facts, it seems not too far fetched to
conjecture that under more favorable circumstances Pap could have served as a
mediator between the “analytic” and “continental” tradition thereby overcoming
the dogmatic dualism of these two philosophical currents that has characterized
philosophy in the second half the 20th century.
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1 Introduction
Themain thesis of this paper is that Pap’s The A Priori in Physical Theory (Pap 1946,
henceforth FAP) and Cassirer’s Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics
(Cassirer 1937, henceforth DI) may be conceived as two kindred accounts of a late
Neo-Kantian philosophy of science. They elucidate and clarify each othermutually
by elaborating conceptual possibilities and pointing out affinities of neo-Kantian
ideas with other currents of 20th century’s philosophy of science, namely, prag-
matism, conventionalism, and logical empiricism.
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In his early papers Pap heavily drew on Cassirer’s DI. More precisely, Pap’s
central concept of the functional a priori can be shown to be closely related to the
concept of “principles” that plays a central role in DI.1 Thus, in order to understand
Pap’s “functional a priori” one has to understand the role of “principles” in DI, or
so I want to argue. The origins of Pap’s theory of the “functional a priori” in FAP
can be found in his early papers inwhich Cassirer’s influence ismost clearly visible
(cf. Pap 1943, p. 44).
An expedient point of departure is David Stump’s recent claim that for un-
derstanding Pap’s philosophy of science
Neo-Kantianism is important because it formed a context for the work of the Pragmatists, the
Vienna Circle and to Poincaré’s work. It grounds the focus on the human element of
knowledge and provides the basic distinctions between the a priori and the empirical and the
analytic and synthetic. (Stump 2015, p. 104)
The thesis that Neo-Kantianism is a convenient “synthetizing” context for the
project of a comprehensive philosophy of science that takes into account aspects
of pragmatism, logical empiricism, and conventionalism is certainly apt for
elucidating Pap’s thought. This thesis, however, would have hardly been
endorsed by many pragmatists, Vienna Circle logical empiricists, or the con-
ventionalists: American pragmatists such as Dewey, James, or C.I. Lewis never
paid much attention to German Neo-Kantianism, the members of the Vienna
Circle flatly denied that anything could be learned from Neo-Kantian “school
philosophy”, and conventionalists such as Poincaré had not much interest to
delve in the philosophical subtleties of Neo-Kantianism. On the other hand, the
leading Neo-Kantian philosopher Cassirer did pay serious attention to then
1 DI was not translated into English before 1956. Together with Cassirer’s untimely death in 1945
and the general eclipse of neo-Kantianism after 1945 this may have contributed to the fact that the
Neo-Kantian aspects of Pap’s philosophy were ignored or at least severely underestimated in the
Anglo-Saxon philosophical scene in the following decades. Another factor that may have
contributed to the eclipse of the neo-Kantian aspects of Pap’s thought may be that later in his
philosophical career Pap attempted to play down (or even deny) any non-analytic neo-Kantian
influence on his thought. Nevertheless, it seems, he never succeeded to be fully recognized as a
mainstream analytic philosopher. This is evidenced already by browsing through many of the
reviews that his last two books Semantics and Necessary Truth: An Inquiry into the Foundations of
Analytic Philosophy (Pap 1958) and An Introduction into the Philosophy of Science (Pap 1962)
received. See Section 2 of this paper for somemore detailed remarks on this issue. Be this as it may,
the present paper is primarily on Pap’s early philosophy. It does not pretend to cover this author’s
entire philosophical evolution.
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contemporary rival currents of philosophy such as pragmatism, convention-
alism, and logical empiricism.2
In order to understand the relevance of Cassirer’s Neo-Kantianism for Pap it is
necessary to go beyond the general characterization of Neo-Kantianism as a cur-
rent of philosophy of science that “grounds the focus on the human element of
knowledge”. Indeed, the specific source for the importance of Neo-Kantianism on
Pap’s philosophy can be localized rather precisely, or so I want to argue in this
paper. To be precise, the main source of inspiration for Pap’s account of the
“functional a priori” was Cassirer’s Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der
modernen Physik (Cassirer 1937). DI was Cassirer’s last great work in philosophy of
science and appeared 1937 in his Swedish exile in German. Together with Sub-
stance and Function (Cassirer 1910), Einstein’s Theory of Relativity (Cassirer 1921),
DI should be recognized as an essential piece of Cassirer’s Neo-Kantian philosophy
of science. Another, more specific reason to take into consideration DI is that it
helps understand Pap’s early philosophy of science as put forward in FAP as a
peculiar philosophical stance located somewhere between the currents of neo-
Kantianism, pragmatism, and logical empiricism. Indeed, this is the main reason
why DI is discussed in some detail in this paper.
The organization of this paper is as follows. To set the stage, in the next
section, I briefly discuss the comments of some philosophers on Pap’s phi-
losophy of science. All of them show a certain perplexity of how to assess Pap’s
philosophical position. Critics of quite different philosophical perspectives
agreed that the philosopher Pap was difficult to classify, although no one
denied his logical and philosophical qualities and originality. Section 3
elaborates the intimate relations between Pap’s early work and the later
Cassirer’s philosophy of science as presented in DI. In Section 4, I discuss in
some detail Cassirer’s “principles” of DI that play an important role for Pap’s
“functional a priori” elaborated in FAP. Moreover, I want to show that DI offers
convincing arguments for correcting some widely accepted misconceptions of
Cassirer’s account of the a priori. Section 5 deals with the often-ignored
pragmatic aspects of Cassirer’s philosophy of science. Being already present in
his first opus magnum Substance and Function (Cassirer 1910) they are further
elaborated in DI. This aspect of Cassirer’s work is relevant for assessing Pap’s
alleged move from Cassirer’s Neo-Kantianism to Lewis’s and Dewey’s prag-
matisms. In Section 6 I conclude with some speculations what could have
happened with analytic philosophy in Europe if Pap’s project of a
2 For the case of conventionalism, see Biagioli (2016, chapter 6), and for Cassirer’s own rather
positive assessment of the Vienna Circle’s logical empiricism see Cassirer (2011). Cassirer’s relation
to pragmatism is discussed in some detail in Section 5 of this paper.
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“resuscitation of the Vienna Circle” in the early 1950s had not failed for
unfavorable local circumstances.
2 Pap’s Philosophy of Science as a Maverick
Account – Some Scattered Comments
Let us begin by briefly discussing four or five scattered critical comments on Pap’s
philosophy that philosophers of quite different orientations put forward on quite
different occasions for quite different purposes. These remarks do not yield a
coherent picture of Pap’s philosophy. On the contrary, at least some of them betray
a deep-rooted insecurity of what to do with Pap’s philosophy. It may be noted,
however, that all of them either made short shrift or intended to play down any
possible influence that Cassirer’s neo-Kantian philosophy might have had on Pap.
The first author to be mentioned is Brand Blanshard. He is the author of a brief
memoir of Pap thatwas published as an epilogue to Pap’s last bookAn Introduction
to the Philosophy of Science that appeared posthumously in 1962. Blanchard
praised Pap as “one of the ablest younger philosophers of his generation” (Blan-
shard 1962, p. 427) describing his philosophical development as a journey from
speculative beginnings with Hegel and Cassirer towards a soberer and more
rational way of philosophizing somewhere in the neighborhood of logical empir-
icism. According to Blanchard, Pap, after having completed a master’s degree
under the supervision of Cassirer in Yale, soon “found that Cassirer’smetaphysical
speculation held little appeal for him”, andwent to Columbia andwrote a doctoral
dissertation under the pragmatist and logical empiricist Ernest Nagel. A closer look
on this dissertation, i.e., FAP, shows that Blanshard’s neat “replacement thesis”
(from European “Neo-Kantianism” to American Analytic Philosophy and prag-
matism) is too simple to be true. This will be shown in the following sections.
The second philosopher of science I’d like to mention is Mary Hesse. In 1966
she wrote a review of An Introduction to Philosophy of Science (Pap 1962):
Philosophically speaking, Pap … may be said to have been a logical empiricist with a bad
conscience. [In his book [t]he scaffolding constructed by the Vienna Circle is everywhere
visible, but Papwas far too intelligent, and far too competent in logic andmathematics, not to
know that even the latter-day modifications forced upon this framework will not suffice to
hold it up indefinitely.…
Pap’s strength does not lie in chiselling out from philosophy of science those fundamental
philosophical questions which are beginning to come to light in a post-Vienna era. What he
does very well is provide some of the elementary mathematical and logical tools which are
and will remain indispensable to the philosopher of Science. (Mary Hesse 1966, p. 457).
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Hesse, engaged in elaborating her own, anti-Viennese account of a philosophy of
science – based on the notions of model and analogy – criticized Pap’s account as
still being too much influenced by the allegedly obsolete Viennese logical empiri-
cism. On the other hand, she felt that it would be somehow inadequate to charac-
terize Pap simply as an ordinary logical empiricist. Hence, she took refuge to the
rather cryptic characterizationof Papas a “logical empiricistwith abad conscience”.
The next comment is from Paul Feyerabend. In his autobiography he wrote:
Arthur [Pap] had studiedmusic and still excelled at the piano. After switching to philosophy,
he worked with Cassirer and wrote a splendid essay on the a priori in physical theory (FAP,
T.M). He then joined the analytic movement, made important contributions and published a
textbook. Gradually he read less and wrote more; his writing became thin and unsubstantial.
(Feyerabend 1995, pp. 99f)
This quotation suggests that Feyerabend considered FAP not as a work of analytic
philosophy proper but as an opus related to Cassirer’s neo-Kantian philosophy of
science. Regrettably, Feyerabend never explainedwhy he characterized Pap’s later
analytic writings as “thin and unsubstantial”. Whatever he might have had in
mind, it seems that also Feyerabend considered a characteristic feature of Pap’s
philosophy that it was localized somewhere “between” Neo-kantianism and
“standard” analytic philosophy.3
Finally, I want to deal with some comments on Pap’s life and work made by
Alfons Keupink and Sanford Shieh, who edited Pap’s Selected Papers that appeared
in 2006. Arthur Pap already died in 1959 at the early age of 38. This is too young an
age for a philosopher to becomewell-knownoutside a restricted circle of specialists.
Hence, the short Intellectural Biography of Arthur Pap written by Keupink is quite
useful for every scholar who is interested in Pap’s work (cf. Keupink 2006).
After arriving with his family in 1941 in the United States, Pap settled in New
York City. He started to study philosophy at Columbia University in the fall of 1941.
After obtaining his B.A. at Columbia, he went to Yale University in 1943 for his
master’s degree. There, Cassirer became his supervisor and provided the original
stimulus for Pap’s work on hypothetical necessity and the functional a priori. In
1944 Pap returned to Columbia where he completed his PhD thesis The Functional
A Priori in Physical Theory (FAP, Pap 1946) under the supervision of Ernest Nagel.
Sanford Shieh, the second editor of Pap’s Selected Papers, contributes a
detailed overview of Pap’s philosophical work. From this text I’d like to quote the
3 Feyerabend’s role in Pap’s life was not restricted, however, to make these rather ephemeral com-
ments onhis philosophical evolution. For a short period in the 1950s he served as Pap’s assistant at the
University of Vienna and played a significant role in the publication of Pap’s book Analytische
Erkenntnistheorie. Kritische Übersicht über die neueste Entwicklung in USA und England (Pap 1955). We
will deal with this episode of Pap’s life in more detail in the last section of this paper.
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following remarks that resume some of the issues that already Hesse treated in her
review of Pap (1962) some 40 years ago, adding to them a further twist:
MaryHesse once describedArthur Papas a “logical empiricistwith a bad conscience.”…, this
is true as far as it goes, but its emphasis is not quite right, nor does it go far enough. Much of
Pap’s bad conscience derives… from allegiance to Cassirer’s neo-Kantianism. Pap wouldn’t
give up this allegiance because he saw a deep tension in logical empiricism at its very best,
namely, in the work of Carnap. The tension is between Carnap’s adherence to the picture of
rational inquiry underlying his continued insistence on an analytic-synthetic distinction, and
his attempt to be thoroughgoingly pragmatic asmanifested in his adoption of the Principle of
Tolerance. (Shieh 2006, p. 43)
While Hesse had nothing to say about the causes of Pap’s “bad conscience” Shieh
offers sort of an explanation: He interprets Pap as a half-hearted critique of logical
empiricism who was aware of the limits of this approach due to his continuing
adherence to Cassirer’s neo-Kantianism. He nowhere explains Pap’s “allegiance
with Cassirer” in any further detail, however, nor does he elucidate why Pap’s
continuing adherence to Cassirer’s neo-Kantianism might have caused his
discontent with Carnap’s allegedly thoroughgoing pragmatism. Nevertheless,
Shieh’s cryptic remarks portends a basic problem for any interpretation of Pap’s
philosophy, namely, how it is related to the then contemporary currents of phi-
losophy of science. Shieh’s comments provide evidence that Pap’s philosophy of
science was a problem for virtually all philosophies of science. Somehow, Papwas
sitting on the fence between various established philosophical currents such as
Logical Positivism, American Pragmatism, and Neo-Kantian Critical philosophy.
This is evident by the peculiar interpretation of Poincaré’s famous characterization
of “principles” that Pap chose as the motto of FAP:
Principles are conventions and definitions in disguise. They are, however, deduced from
experimental laws, and these laws have, so to speak, been erected into principles to which
our mind attributes an absolute value. (Foreword of FAP, vii, Poincaré 1906, p. 138)
For Pap, Poincaré’s “principles” were closely related to Cassirer’s Neo-Kantian
“principles” in a peculiar way relating them with pragmatic and logical empiricist
philosophemes:
It is one of the merits of the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism to have disclosed the intimate
connections between Kant’s Critique, especially the Transcendental Analytic, and Newton’s
mechanics. …
We shall now apply the functional theory of the a priori to such alleged synthetic a priori
principles of Newtonian mechanics. These will be shown to be either functionally analytic –
at times referred to as “regulative principles”, without foregoing, by this denomination, their
claim to descriptive content – or inductive generalizations that have been transformed, in the
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process for formalization, into real definitions (factually grounded conventions), or, indeed,
imperatives addressed to scientific procedure. (FAP, p. 39)
According to Pap, it would be a gross misunderstanding to take this interpretation
as directed against logical empiricist philosophy of science according towhich “all
significant propositions are either analytic or empirical, such that no apodeictic
knowledge of reality is possible”. Rather, he assured the reader that [FAP] “pre-
sents … a “supplementary emphasis” to the more standard logical positivists
account. What this meant for Pap will be discussed in detail in the next section.
3 DI and Pap’s Philosophical Beginnings
DI was Cassirer’s last book on philosophy of science proper. It may be considered
as the definite account of his theory of the relativized and historized a priori. The
reception of DI among philosophers and physicists was rather mixed. Philipp
Frankwrote a “generous” review that admitted that Cassirer was on the right track,
but, “of course”, he did not admit that the logical empiricists could learn anything
from DI that they did not already know (cf. Frank 1938). Ernest Nagel’s review was
less friendly (cf. Nagel 1938). Although he applauded to “Professor Cassirer’s great
historical erudition as well as the insights characteristic of the Marburg Neo-
Kantian movement” Nagel complained that DI did not offer anything “essentially
new” that the reader didn’t already know from Cassirer’s earlier writings, in
particular Substance and Function (Cassirer 1910). In sum, according to Nagel,
there was only some “Kantian terminology and piety” in DI distinguished Cas-
sirer’s account from what “naturalistic pragmatists and logical empiricists could
have written (cf. Nagel 1938, p. 230).4
In contrast to philosophers, physicists reacted quite positively to DI. As
Thomas Ryckman reports, the physicists Einstein, Born, and von der Laue highly
praised DI, although they did not review it (cf. Ryckman 2015, p. 86). When an
English translation of DI posthumously appeared in 1956, the physicist Henry
Margenau wrote an enthusiastic introduction and praised it as a visionary novel
philosophical interpretation of quantum theory (cf. Margenau 1956).
These positive reactions did not prevent that DI played no important role in the
Cassirer renaissance that took place in the last two decades. For example, Michael
4 In light of Nagel’s dismissive review of DI it is hardly surprising that he rejected a first version of
FAP. In this version, as is reported by Stump, Cassirer’s influence was much more visible than in
the final version (cf. Stump 2020, pp. 6ff). According to Pap’s own harsh self-incrimination in the
Acknowledgment of FAP, in his early years of philosophyhe sometimes had succumbed to the vice
of a metaphysical “pathos of obscurity” (FAP, Acknowledgement, v).
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Friedman does not treat DI neither in his influentialDynamics of Reason (Friedman
2001) nor in A Parting of the Ways. Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger (Friedman
2000), nor in Synthetic History Reconsidered (Friedman 2010) although Cassirer’s
philosophy occupies centre stage in all these works.
The critical attention that DI received in philosophy almost completely
concentrated on the issue of the role that it ascribed to the venerable concept of
causality after quantum theory had arrived on the scene in the 1920s (cf. Cei and
French 2009; Pringe 2007, 2014; Ryckman 2015). For the topic of Pap’s functional a
priori this was less important. Interesting for Pap was the more general, but less
prominent topic of the general architecture of physical theories that was also dealt
with in DI. The main novelty (compared with Substance and Function (Cassirer
1910) and Einstein’s Theory of Relativity (Cassirer 1921) that Cassirer proposed in DI
was the proposal that one should strictly distinguish between three types of
statements of a physical theory:
1. Statements of results of measurements.
2. Statements of laws.
3. Statements of principles.
In Cassirer’s terminology, statements of results of measurements are individual
statements, statements of laws are general, and statements of principles are uni-
versal (cf. DI, p. 54). Cassirer insisted that the roles of these three types of state-
ments were essentially different. Statements of results of measurements are only
the first step in the transition from the realm of the given to the realm of scientific
knowledge, or, in other words “from the world of sense to the world of physics (DI,
p. 31)”. They had to be complemented by statements of laws and by statements of
principles. An important feature of this tripartition was that there did not exist a
“continuous path” from one level to the other. Rather, the three levels were
separated by conceptual discontinuities. Or, in Cassirer’s ownwords, moving from
one level to the other required a conceptual “jump“.
Cassirer considered it a fundamental conceptual error of logical empiricist
philosophy of science that it did not recognize the discontinuity that existed be-
tween the three types of statements. Particularly harmful consequences followed if
statements of laws were not distinguished from statements of principles, since
thereby logical empiricism lost the conceptual means of adequately dealing with
the evolution of scientific knowledge. This issue of evolution was, as is well
known, an essential feature of scientific knowledge for the Marburg philosophy of
science since its very beginning. Statements of principles are characterized in DI as
follows:
8 T. Mormann
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Principles are… bold anticipations that justify themselves inwhat they accomplish byway of
construction and inner organization of our total knowledge. They refer not directly to phe-
nomena but to the form of the laws according to whichwe order these phenomena. A genuine
principle, therefore, is not equivalent to a natural law. It is rather the birthplace of natural
laws, a matrix as it were, out of which new natural laws may be born again and again. (DI,
p. 53)
For Pap’s philosophy, the discussions of Cassirer’s interpretation of quantum
theories were less important. After all, his early philosophical writings and, in
particular, FAP only dealt with classical physics. More precisely, FAP dealt with
the “application of the functional theory of the a priori to Newtonian mechanics”
(FAP, Part 2). Pap’s discussion of Cassirer’s principles concentrated on what may
be called the principle of continuity and other “geometrical” principles (cf. FAP,
pp. 83ff).5
Indeed, Pap’s philosophical oeuvre began with an interpretation of the
concept of principles as presented in DI. In his first published paper ever On the
Meaning of Necessity (1943), Pap clearly stated that his functional a priori like
Cassirer’s principles of DI, expresses hypothetical necessities:
Such hypothetical necessities, or leading principles, bridge, so to speak, the gap between the
contingency of empirical conjunctions and the “simple” necessity of formal connections, for
they function essentially as means of systematizing facts, of rendering the body of factual
knowledge coherent. It is by their instrumentality that facts acquire representative or signi-
fying capacity, and thus evidential value. (Pap 1943, p. 49).
The functional a priori provided the means to overcome an overly simplistic
positivist dichotomy:
The positivistic – allegedly exhaustive – disjunction of judgments into empirical (contingent)
and analytic (necessary) judgments takes no account of “synthetic a priori principles”which
are, in Cassirer’s words, “Regeln, gemäß deren nach Gesetzen zu suchen ist und nach denen
diese zu finden sind”. The empiricist walks on the plane of particulars and contemns the “high
priori roads”; the rationalist walks on the “high priori roads” and contemns the plane of
particulars. The functionalist, however, recognizes the functional correlation of plane and
high-road: Die Höhenwege sind für unsere Orientierung in dem Gelände, das wir zu durchs-
chreiten haben, unerläßlich.” (Pap 1943, p. 57)
To put it bluntly, in Pap (1943) the functional a priori was just another name for
Cassirer’s Höhenwege aka principles. The central role of DI’s principles for Pap’s
5 Following Reichenbach’s Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis a priori (1920), Pap characterised
these principles explicitly as constitutive principles (cf. FAP, chapter III).
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FAP6 has been rather ignored up to now. In FAP, Pap’s formulations are a bit more
cautious than in Pap (1943). He no longer prided himself to have overcome the
“allegedly exhaustive” positivist disjunction of empirical (contingent) and ana-
lytic (necessary) judgements. Instead, he was content to claim for his functional
theory nomore than compatibility with the standard positivist or logical empiricist
account in that the functional theory offers a “supplementary emphasis” to logical
empiricism:
The present analysis [of FAP]… in no way contradicts the positivistic working hypothesis [of
logical empiricists that all significant propositions are either analytic or empirical]. It pre-
sents, however, a supplementary emphasis by focusing attention upon existential inquiry as
thematrix of those “linguistic” conventions that give rise to analytic truth and upon the ways
in which synthetic propositions function analytically without definitely assuming the status
of “linguistic” conventions. (Pap 1946, pp. 40ff.)
Criticizing this passage as rather obscure one probably does not run a high risk to be
blamed as someone who is excessively picky. On the contrary. This piece of Pap
certainly does not serve as an example of crystal-clear analytic philosophy. In order
to understand what Pap’s intention was, it it necessary to go back to his earlier
Meaning and Necessity (Pap 1943). There, he proposed the following, admittedly
rather speculative, conflation of Kant, Cassirer, andDewey as an elucidation ofwhat
he meant by the “supplementary emphasis” that he offered in FAP:
Cassirer tends to assimilate Kant’s doctrine of the a priori to the functional-pragmatic inter-
pretation of the a priori as amethodological rule: “Das a priorimuß in reinmethodologischem
Sinne verstandenwerden… (Cassirer 1937, p. 93).… [T]he typically Kantian conjunction of “a
priori”with “synthetic” is essentially an attempt to overcome the dualistic separation of the a
priori and the empirical, and is thus opposed to the rationalistic identification of “a prioriwith
“analytic” or “logically necessary”. For the rationalists the “a priori” or “axiomatic” has intra-
logical significance, i.e., its meaning is not defined in terms of empirical application; which
the “synthetic a priori” is synthetic insofar as it is essentially a prodedural means, to use
Dewey’s term, in existential inquiry. Insofar as it has no alternatives, it is, indeed axiomatic,
“simply” necessary; insofar, however, as it is nothing but a conceptual tool of existential
inquiry, a “universal” in Dewey’s sense, it is hypothetically necessary. [Against Kant] [w]hat
is a priori at one time, may have been a posteriori character at an earlier time; rules or criteria
are themselves derived from, generated by, existence. Something is a priori, in other words,
not simpliciter, but secundum quid, i.e., for one phase of the continuum of inquiry; it may be a
posteriori for another phase of the same. As Dewey puts it (cf. Dewey 1938, p. 14) Norms of
inquiry are “operationally a priori with respect to further inquiry.” (Pap 1943, p. 53)
6 A telling example is Friedman’s claim in Dynamics of Reason: “For Pap, in the end, what is
functionally a priori is simply what is especially well confirmed or established, and in this way,
Pap’s approach is ultimately no different from Quine’s appeal to entrenchment.” (DR, p. 88,
Footnote 22).
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Not everybody will agree with Pap’s conflation of the different, allegedly “prag-
matic” a priori accounts put forward by Kant, Cassirer, and Dewey. The issue
whether Pap’s account is plausible or not, is not, however, to be discussed in the
present paper. Rather, the point I want to make is that these quotations from FAP
and earlier works of Pap suffice to recognize him unmistakenly as a philosophical
child of Cassirer. It may well be the case that in later years this descendency is less
visible. But this is the usual course of things. Moreover, Pap had very convincing,
perhaps not purely philosophical reasons to play down Cassirer’s influence.
Indeed, Pap had to write two versions of his dissertation, because his supervisor
Ernest Nagel required to revise the first version that he rejected as “too meta-
physical”, i.e., as too openly influenced by Cassirer’s neo-Kantianism. As Pap
himself confessed he owed to Nagel’s influence the “conversion from the meta-
physical “pathos of obscurity” … to conscientious endeavors of clear, rigorous
thinking mainly to his philosophical influence” (FAP, v).7
Apart from issues of the philosophy of quantum theory DI has remained a
rather neglected piece of Cassirer’s philosophy of science. This has the regrettable
consequence that also Cassirer’s account of the a priori (as well as Pap’s) is often
misunderstood. An important consequence of such a misunderstanding for
contemporary philosophy of science will be discussed in the next section.
4 Cassirer’s a priori in the Light of DI
A closer look at DI is not only useful for understanding FAP, it may also help better
understand Cassirer’s philosophy of science in general, particularly his account of
the a priori. DI presents a concept of the a priori that is hardly compatiblewith the a
priori that is usually attributed to Cassirer stemming from his dispute with Moritz
Schlick on the compatibility of Neo-Kantian philosophy of science with Einstein’s
theory of the relativity.
In light of the discovery of Non-Euclidean geometries and evenmore clearly in
light of Einstein’s theory of relativity, Cassirer and Neo-Kantian philosophy of
science in general could not (and did not) stick to Kant’s original conception of the
a priori. For the Marburg Neokantians the problem arose to formulate a successor
7 A peak of such an “metaphysical pathos of obscurity” that probably Nagel disliked consider-
ably, can be found in Pap (1944) where he – although with some hesitation – subscribed to
Hermann Cohen’s account of “Bewußtsein überhaupt” as the subject matter of Kantian “tran-
scendental logic”. Already then, he pointed out that somemay “dislike the notion of “Bewußtsein
überhaupt” because of its metaphysical “pathos of obscurity” (Pap 1944, p. 69). On the “asym-
metrical” influence of Nagel and Cassirer on Pap, see Stump (2020, pp. 6ff).
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concept of the Kantian a priori that preserved at least partially the “Kantian spirit”
of the original concept and that, at the same time, could cope with the challenges
put forward by post-Kantian science.
As is well known, Kant’s a priori had both regulative and constitutive aspects.
A crucial problem for amodernized concept of the a prioriwaswhether this duality
between the regulative and the constitutive could be preserved in oneway or other.
Cassirer’s a priori has often been criticized to fail in this respect. For instance,
Friedman asserts: “Cassirer’s conception of the a priori is purely regulative, with no
remaining constitutive elements.” (Friedman 2001, p. 60, footnote 80).8 A closer
look on Cassirer’s text of 1921, however, reveals that Friedman’s claim is mistaken.
Cassirer’s a priori is not purely regulative, it also has constitutive ingredients, or so
I want to argue: A contentful constitutive a priori is present already in Cassirer’s
treatise on relativity theory (Cassirer 1921) – the “theory” of such a constitutive a
priori is most explicitly formulated in DI. This is not to say that such a theory was to
be considered as a completely new ingredient of Cassirer’s thought. Cassirer
claimed that this theory was fully in linewith the account of the a priori formulated
almost 30 years earlier in Substance and Function (Cassirer 1910).
Although many philosophers of science have considered Friedman’s thesis
that Cassirer’s a priori was purely regulative as convincing, I want to show that
Friedman is wrong. Actually, Cassirer’s concept of the a priori is richer and less
shallow than is often thought. This can be seen by looking more carefully on
Cassirer (1921) and by taking into account the role of “principles” that Cassirer
offered in DI. This requires a detailed interpretation of the relevant texts.
According to Friedman, already Schlick in his well-known critical review of
Cassirer’s Einstein’s Theory of Relativity (Cassirer 1921) recognized that Cassirer’s a
prioriwas purely regulative. In Friedman (2000) he reports Schlick’s contention as
follows:
[Cassirer’s] a priori of space … does not include … any assertion about a determinate
particular structure of space, but is concerned onlywith the function of “spatiality in general”
… entirelywithout regard to itsmoreparticular determination. (Schlick 1921, p. 101; Friedman
2000, p. 115, Footnote)
For Schlick, and still for many contemporary philosophers of science as well, this
quotation conclusively showed that Cassirer, confronted with Einstein’s theory,
subscribed to a purely regulative a priori that many (not Friedman himself)
8 In contrast, Friedman claims, his own conception of a relativized a priori, preserves a consti-
tutive component: The present conception (of Friedman, T.M.) results from combining the rela-
tivized yet still constitutive a priori developed within the logical empiricist tradition with the
Marburg version of the regulative use of reason (Friedman 2001, p. 60, footnote 80).
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considered as rather trivial and useless. Actually, Cassirer’s a priori in Cassirer
(1921) is not solely regulative. Schlick and Friedman’s quotation is misleading and
does not convey what Cassirer actually asserted in his book: The complete quote
reads as follows:
[T]he “a priori” of space that [critical Erkenntnistheorie] affirms as the condition of every
physical theory involves… no assertion concerning any definite particular structure of space
in itself, but is concerned only with that function of “spatiality” in general, that is expressed
already in the general concept of the line element ds as such, entirely without regard to its
character in detail (my underlining, T.M.). (Cassirer 1921, p. 101, 1923, p. 433).
From the German original, it transpires that the phrase “without regard to its
character in detail” does not refer to “spatiality in general”, but to “line element”.9
This is rendered completely clear from the text that immediately follows:
If… the determination of this element (i.e., the line element ds, T.M.) as it is done in Euclidean
geometry, does not suffice for the mastery of certain problems of knowledge of nature then
nothing can prevent us, from a methodological standpoint, from replacing it by another
9 The German original reads as follows: “Denn das “A priori” des Raumes, das sie ( = criticial
theory of knowledge) als Bedingung jeder physikalischen Theorie behauptet, schließt, wie sich
gezeigt hat, keine Behauptung über eine bestimmte einzelne Struktur des Raumes in sich, sondern
geht nur auf jene Funktion der „Räumlichkeit überhaupt“, die sich schon in dem allgemeinen
Begriff des Linienelements ds als solchen – ganz abgesehen von seiner näheren Bestimmung –
ausdrückte.“ The possessive pronoun “seiner” in the phrase „seiner näheren Bestimmung”
unambiguously indicates that this phrase refers to “Linienelement”, and not to “Räumlichkeit
überhaupt.” This shows that Cassirer’s a priori of space as a “condition of every physical theory” is
the a priori of Riemannian geometry encapsulated in the concept of the (Riemannian) line element
ds. This a priori is more general than the traditional Euclidean a priori (that amounts that Rie-
mannian curvature K, defined by ds, is 0), but it is still a contentful constitutive a priori.
In his most recent contribution to the issue of the a priori Friedman points out that Schlick is
wrong in blaming Cassirer not to delineate in any way the content of his alleged a priori of
“spatiality in general”. He makes clear that Cassirer‘s a priori of “spatiality in general” refers to
Riemannian geometry. As Friedman rightly points out Riemannian geometry certainly is a very
non-trivial and contentful a priori principle. Riemannian geometry is not just a cheap general-
ization of Euclidean geometry in the sense that for the more general Riemannian geometry cur-
vature is allowed to be a variable (instead of being the constant 0), but Riemannian geometry
amounts to a considerable “lowering of the foundations” as Cassirer used to say (following Hil-
bert). Thus, Riemannian geometry was, for Cassirer the best then available approximation of a
universal invariant of physical knowledge. According to Friedman, the general character of Rie-
mannian geometry (comparedwith Euclidean geometry) deprives it of all constitutive features and
renders it a purely regulativea priori (Friedman 2010, p. 683). Not everybodyagrees:Heis considers
Riemanniangeometry as constitutive and regulative (seeHeis 2014, p. 14). RelyingonCassirer’sDI,
it seems that this ecumenical stance is the most congenial attitude to this issue. Also, for
Richardson 2010), the central difficulty of Cassirer’s concept of the a priori resides in the relation
between its constitutive and regulative moments.
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measure, in so far as the latter proves to be necessary and fruitful physically… (Cassirer 1921,
p. 101, 1923, p. 433).
Thus, in Einstein’s Theory of Relativity (Cassirer 1921) Cassirer maintained a highly
non-trivial constitutive spatial a priori, namely, the Riemannian structure of
spacetime encapsulated in the Riemannian line element ds.
Many philosophers of science do not accept Friedman’s thesis. For instance,
Thomas Ryckman argued that for Cassirer the principle of general covariance was
an important a priori principle that was both constitutive and regulative (Ryckman
2005, chapter 2.5, pp. 40ff). Krois,more recently, claimed that according to Cassirer
the concept of “symbolic pregnancy” is a constitutive and not only regulatory a
priori in the cultural sciences (cf. Krois 2010, p. 267). Somewhat differently,
Richardson has argued that Cassirer (unsuccessfully) attempted to formulate “a
transcendental logic of objective knowledge” that embraced constitutive and
regulative elements (cf. Richardson 2010, chapter 5).10 Perhaps the most
comprehensive account of Cassirer’s theory of the a priori has been put forward by
Heis in Realism, functions, and the a priori: Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of science
(Heis 2014), who argues that Cassirer’s theory of the a priori comprises constitutive
and regulative, as well as absolute and relativized aspects without falling into
inconsistency (cf. Heis 2014). This paper is not the appropriate place to enter into
this multifaceted debate in any detail. The only point I want to make is that,
somewhat surprisingly, none of the protagonists of the ongoing discussion has
paid much attention to what Cassirer said on this issue in DI, in particular, in his
theory of “principles”. Taking into account the “principles” of DI is evidence that
Cassirer – at the end of his career as a philosopher of science – indeed conceived
the a priori in a constitutive and regulative way. That the regulative and the
constitutive function as complementary aspects of his a priori becomes clearer if
DI’s principles are taken into account. In the metaphorical language of DI Rie-
mannian geometry becomes “a matrix out of which new natural laws may be born
again and again”.
Back to Pap. Instead of themetaphorical term “matrices” Pap in FAP and in his
earlier papers often characterized “matrices” simply as leading principles or as
methods that guide the praxis of scientists.
In FAP and his other writings Pap did not deal with Riemannian geometry, but
mainly with the more elementary a priori principles of Newtonian physics, for
instance, the spatial and geometrical a priori assumptions that assert that empir-
ically meaningful functions have to be “continuous”, and every magnitude that
10 In Richardson (2010) the author proposes to clarify the relation between the constitutive and
the regulative a priori by invoking the complementarity between Hegelian and Kantian aspects in
Cassirer’s (and Friedman’s) thought (cf. Richardson 2010, p. 288).
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that is to be interpreted as “force” has to satisfy the laws of vector calculus.
According to Pap, Newtonian physics had to assume a considerable amount of
classical mathematics as a constitutive a priori. Without taking into consideration
the theory of principles put forward in DI, Cassirer’s conception of the a priori is
misunderstood. The same holds for Pap’s functional a priori that rather faithfully
follows Cassirer’s account.
Stump rightly remarks that the purely regulative a priori that Schlick and
Friedman ascribe to Cassirer is untenable:
What we actually use in science is our current understanding of concepts, not what the concepts
…will be at the hypothetical end of inquiry. The understanding of the concepts that we actually
use in science do change from one historical period to another and therefore the supposedly
universal and fixed elements of the a priori vanish. If we look at science as it is actually practiced,
as I think we must, there are no universal and fixed concepts in science, given that the under-
standing of the fundamental concepts changes over time. (Stump 2015, p. 94)
Stump is certainly right in pointing out that ghostly concepts like “spatiality in
general” are hardly relevant for real science. The point is that a “purely regulative
Cassirer” who allegedly endorsed such concepts is not the real Cassirer. DI shows
that Cassirer’s a priori was not so anemic as Schlick, Friedman, and many others
want to make us believe. The development of modern mathematical physics has
amply demonstrated that the mathematical theory of Riemannian geometry is
justly characterized as a regulative and constitutitve a priori principle that has
turned out to be an immensely fruitful matrix for a wealth of theoretical and
practical physical knowledge.
5 Cassirer’s “Theoretical Pragmatism”
Cassirer was not a narrow-minded orthodox Neo-Kantian. Throughout his career he
was open for many philosophical and scientific influences. In this section, I’d like to
arguemore specifically that some kind of “theoretical pragmatism”may be attributed
to him since the beginnings of his systematic philosophy of science in Substance and
Function (1910). This is relevant for an adequate interpretation of Pap’s philosophy of
science, since thereby a simplistic periodization of influences onPap’s philosophyà la
“first characterized by Cassirer’s neo-Kantianism, then influenced by Dewey’s and
Lewis’s pragmatism, and finally by Carnap’s logical empiricism” is rendered not very
convincing. In particular, American pragmatism and European neo-Kantianism as
influences on Pap’s philosophy should not be played off against each other.
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A pragmatic component in Cassirer’s philosophy of science is encapsulated in
the claim that “valid” concepts contain “plans for possible constructions of unity”.
Concepts are not descriptions of facts but blue prints for further experiences:
“[Scientific] concepts are valid, not in that they copy a fixed, given being, but in so far as they
containaplan forpossible constructionsofunitywhichmustbeprogressivelyverified inpractice,
in application to the empirical material. … We need, not the objectivity of absolute things, but
rather the objective determinateness of the method of experience. (Cassirer 1910, p. 322).
Pragmatic aspects of Cassirer’s philosophy of science are already present in Cas-
sirer’s early philosophy of science, i.e., in his Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff
(1910). There he emphasized the affinity of his “Critical Idealism”withDewey’s and
James’s pragmatisms (cf. Cassirer 1910, chapter VII). He pointed out that a so-
phisticated version of pragmatism such as Dewey’s (to be distinguished from the
vulgar versions of this doctrine)was fully in linewith his Neo-Kantian own “critical
idealist” account of knowledge.11 More precisely, he argued that Dewey’s prag-
matism, correctly understood, was concerned with the relation between the
objectively valid propositions of science and the activity of thought:
[T]hought has here become the pure and complete expression of “doing”.… Our inferences and
conclusions, our investigations and experiments are “practical”… in the sense that it is the unity
of all thought,which stands constantly before us as anultimate goal anddirects out cognition.…
Eachhypothesis of knowledgehas its justificationmerelywith reference to this fundamental task;
it is valid to the degree that it succeeds in intellectually organizing andharmoniously shaping the
originally isolated sensuous data. (Cassirer 1910, p. 344, 1923, p. 318)
Thus, from early on, pragmatic considerations were not totally alien to Cassirer’s
thought. For the early Pap, as a student of Cassirer’s, that meant that he needed not
break with his master’s doctrines to acquire a liking for pragmatism. Already in Pap
1943 and Pap 1944 Pap emphasized the role of pragmatic considerations in the
formulation of the functional a priori, often quoting Dewey’s Logic-The Theory of
Inquiry (Dewey 1938). Thus, Pap’s reliance on American pragmatism should not be
taken as an aspect of his thought that was added more or less artificially later and
replaced his Neo-Kantian traits. For instance, in Pap 1943 he interprets Cassirer as a
neo-Kantian “who tends to assimilate Kant’s doctrine of the a priori to the functional-
pragmatic interpretation of the a priori”, thereby approaching Dewey’s concept of an
“operationally a priori with respect to further inquiry” (Dewey 1938, p. 14; Cassirer
11 This is not to say, of course, that Cassirer can be characterized simply as a pragmatist without
qualifications. For a detailed and still readable account of the similarities and dissimilarities of
Cassirer’s and Dewey’s accounts of knowledge, see Kaufmann (1949).
For a discussion of the relation betweenCassirer’s andDewey’s general “philosophical projects”
see Freyberg and Niklas (2018).
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1937, p. 93). He even voiced the concern that Cassirer’s reading of Kantmight bemore
pragmatist than was permitted to a faithful Kantian (Pap 1943, p. 53). In any case, for
Pap, the Neo-Kantian Cassirer of DI and the pragmatist Dewey of Logic 1938went well
together (cf. also Stump 2015, pp. 104ff.). In sum, Pap’s pragmatic account of the
functional a priori is quite similar to Cassirer’s “Neo-Kantian” account. FAP and
Cassirer’s late Neo-Kantian philosophy of science of DI may be characterized as two
kindred pragmatistically influenced neo-Kantian philosophies of science.
Taking intoaccount the influenceofDI evidences thatPap’s functionalaprioriwent
beyond a “hardening” of “empirical facts” to yield pragmatically a priori definitions.
Pap’s functional a priori also includes the aspect of the a priori as a guiding and
generating principle that plays a central role in the evolution of scientific knowledge.
It was a basic tenet of the Marburg Neo-Kantian philosophy of science that
scientific concepts are always preliminary concepts to be replaced by better and
more sophisticated ones in the course of the evolution of science, or, expressed in
the well-known dictum of Cassirer’s Marburg colleague Paul Natorp “Science is a
fact in becoming (Werdefaktum)”. This entails, as both Cassirer and Pap empha-
sized, that principles are not fixed once and for all. Rather, they evolve in the
history of science proper. As essential factors of the evolution of science, they are
not to be characterized as a lofty piece of philosophical speculation dealing in an
abstract way with the epistemology or methodology of a scientific theory. Rather,
they are to be characterized as integral ingredients of scientific knowledge. For
Cassirer, this amounted to a kind of pragmatic dialectic of science:
Knowledge of fact and knowledge of principle… are correlative.… Themore the structure of
science develops, and the more sophisticated it becomes, the more it requires proof, and
continual renewal, of its basis. It belongs to the very essence of every science, according to
Hilbert, that a “lowering of the foundations”must accompany the influx of new facts. If this is
true, it is also clear that, and why, the work of discovering and establishing the principles of
the individual sciences cannot be transferred to a particular philosophical discipline, be it
“epistemology” or methodology (Cassirer 1942, pp. 63ff.).
In sum, FAP andPap’s earlier papersmaybe read as attempts to show that this neo-
Kantian perspective was compatible with Dewey’s pragmatist conception of the
development of scientific knowledge.
6 Concluding Speculations
In the “Call for Papers” for the conference Cassirer’s Children the organizers
Massimo Ferrari and Sebastian Luft invited the prospective participants to spec-
ulate that
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the history of 20th century philosophy “might have turned out quite differently had Cassirer
lived long enough in theUnited States to establish a pool of students. Theymight have shaped
the face of philosophy differently. … Indeed, it is not too far-fetched to say that, with the
presence of a balancing figure such as Cassirer, the hostile standoff between “continental”
and “analytic” philosophy, which has polarized the scene since, might have altogether
turned out less hostile or even would not have existed….
This hopeful speculation is in stark contrast with Michael Friedman’s pessimistic
assessment of any possible relation between continental and analytic philosophy
“after 1933”. According to Friedman, the clash between “the analytic” and the
“continental tradition” had become irreconcilable:
The thoroughgoing intellectual estrangement of these two traditions, their almost total lack of
mutual comprehension, is a product of the National Socialist seizure of power in 1933 and the
resulting intellectual migration. Before this… logical positivism, as represented by Carnap,
was very actively engaged with the other vocal movements in the German-speaking philo-
sophical scene – with neo-Kantianism, with Husserlian phenomenology, and even with the
“existential hermeneutic” variant of phenomenology then being developed by Heidegger.
(Friedman 2000, p. 156)
Friedman’s pessimistic assessment directly contradicts the very existence of peo-
ple such as Arthur Pap or Susanne Langer, who long “after 1933” pursued a
philosophy that aimed to overcome the notorious gap between the continental and
the analytic tradition.
Moreover, it may well be doubted that “1933” was the point of no-return that
rendered impossible even for well-intentioned partisans of logical positivism such
as Carnap to maintain a distanced but respectful interest to continental move-
ments of philosophy. In particular, onemay doubt that until 1933 Carnapwas “very
actively engaged with non-logico-empiricist philosophical movements in Ger-
many”. For instance, the often-told pathetic story that Carnap and Heidegger
discussed with each other in Davos is based on a confusion of the abbreviation of
names. Further, Carnap’s relation with Husserlian phenomenology had ended in
dissonance long before 1933 for philosophical discrepancies quite unrelated to the
Nazis’ seizure of power. Similarly, the relation between Cassirer and the Vienna
Circle was rather one-sided. Although Cassirer was earnestly interested in thework
of logical empiricists, as is convincingly evidenced by his Nachlass (cf. Cassirer
2011), no analogous activity can be reported from themembers of the Vienna Circle
logical empiricists.
Thus, the following not-so-well-known episode of the 1950s may be especially
interesting in which Arthur Pap played a central role. Under more fortunate
circumstances, it could have contributed to overcome the “estrangement” between
the two traditions even after WW2. Everything started with a strange post mortem
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afterlife of the Vienna Circle. The original Vienna Circle had been dissolved in the
early 1930s. Carnap and Neurath had emigrated to US and England, respectively,
andwith themurder of Schlick in 1936 the Circle ceased to exist. Or almost so. Some
not so well-known members of the circle stayed in Austria, surviving the “Ans-
chluss” in 1938 and the war. One of them was Victor Kraft. When the war had
ended, Kraft gathered in the early 1950s a group of philosophers and scientists that
aimed to re-stablish in Austria that kind of philosophy that had flourished in
Vienna before the original Circle was dissolved by the Catholic Fascists in the early
1930s. Today, Kraft’s discussion group is sometimes referred to the “Third Vienna
Circle” (Stadler 2010, p.70).
A member of this group was the young Paul Feyerabend. Moreover, Kraft
invited Arthur Pap as a guest professor to the University of Vienna in 1953/54.
There he lectured in German on Analytic theory of knowledge. Paul Feyerabend
served as Pap’s assistant and wrote down and elaborated Pap’s lectures
(cf. Feyerabend 1995, p. 99).12 In 1955 they were eventually published in German as
the book
Analytische Erkenntnistheorie. Kritische Übersicht über
die neueste Entwicklung in USA and England.
The book had the programmatic dedication:
Dem “Wiener Kreis” zum Andenken und zur Wiederbelebung
As already Blanshard pointed out in his memoir on Pap (see Blanshard 1962), the
young Pap was considered by many philosophers, not only in Austria by the
partisans of the so called “Kraft Circle”, but in many other European countries as
well as competent representative of analytic philosophy. Hewas asked to lecture at
Uppsalla and Copenhagen, Oxford and Cambridge. For some time, Pap was even
seriously interested in continuing his career at the University of Vienna.
One can only speculate what would have happened, if he had obtained this
position in Vienna, had not passed away prematurely, and thereby had made a
contribution to establish in Vienna a philosophy that took into account the best
components of the analytical and the Continental tradition.
12 The present paper is not the appropriate place to deal with Pap’s and Feyerabend’s relation in
Vienna in detail. Interesting information on this issue can be found in the correspondence between
Feyerabend and Popper (see Collodel and Oberheim 2020) as well as in Pap’s correspondencewith
philosophers such as Carnap, Hempel, Nagel, and Quine accessible from the Arthur Pap Archives
at the University of Vienna.
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For some unclear reasons, however, his attempts were thwarted by a member
of the philosophical department of the University of Vienna and he did not succeed
to obtain a permanent position in Austria and returned to the USA (Stadler 2010, p.
174). Thus, Pap did not play significant role in the return of Wissenschaft-
sphilosophie to the German-speaking countries after WW2. This role was to be
taken by another member of the Kraft Circle, namely, the Austrian Wolfgang
Stegmüller.
Pap’s Analytische Erkenntnistheorie was not the only and not even the first
book in German that was published after the end of WWII that intended to inform
the German-speaking audience about the philosophical developments that had
taken place in the Anglo-Saxon world after 1933. Already in 1952, Wolfgang
Stegmüller had published Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie (Steg-
müller 1952) whose longest chapter of more than 100 pages dealt with “Logical
Positivism: Rudolf Carnap and other representatives of the Vienna Circle”. While
Pap’s book did not find much attention in the following years, Stegmüller’s book
became a kind of philosophical longseller and a main source of information for a
German-reading public interested in Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy.13 But also
Stegmüller had no success in Vienna. A few years later, the philosophy department
of the Vienna university also impeded that Stegmüller obtained a permanent po-
sition in Vienna. Instead, Stegmüller obtained a chair in Munich, becoming there
the head of the rather successful Münchner Schule that played a major role in the
return of analytic philosophy to Germany after WW2.
In sum, Pap’s stay in Vienna remained an episode that had no lasting effects
on the issue of a possible comeback of analytic philosophy and philosophy of
science to the German-speaking countries after WW2.14 Thus, Pap’s short stay in
1953/54 in Vienna may be considered as a missed opportunity for a new beginning
13 This is not the place to deal with Stegmüller’s Hauptströmungen in detail (cf. Damböck 2010,
Mormann 2010). Be it sufficient to say that Pap’s and Stegmüller’s philosophical styles were quite
different: Although Stegmüller’s opus experienced many re-editions, extensions and enlarge-
ments well into the 1980s, his author never felt the inclination to allow any neo-Kantian or
pragmatist thinker to enter his canon of Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie (Main cur-
rents of contemporary philosophy). Instead, well into the ultimate editions of Hauptströmungen in
the 1980s the reader finds the original chapters of the 1950s edition treating Robert Reininger’s
“Transcendental Idealism”, PaulHäberlin’s “UniversalOnticMonism” etc. simply juxtaposedwith
the alreadymentioned chapter on “Logical positivism: Rudolf Carnap and other representatives of
the Vienna Circle”.
14 Only much later, Vienna played a positive role in the preservation of Pap’s philosophical
heritage. As a kind of belated posthumous correction of Pap’s rejection in the 1950s by the insti-
tutionalized Viennese philosophy onemay interpret the fact that in 2012 the InstituteVienna Circle
(founded in 1991) became the home of the Arthur Pap archivewhere Pap’s posthumous papers are
stored and have been rendered accessible for academic research.
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for European philosophy of science after WW2. In other words, it seems not too far
fetched to conjecture that under more favorable circumstances Pap could have
served as a mediator between the “analytic” and “continental” tradition thereby
overcoming the dogmatic dualism of these two philosophical currents that has
characterized philosophy in the second half the 20th century.
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